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Clinical Education in the Seventies: 
An Appraisal of the Decade 
PRESENTATION TO THE CLINICAL SECTION OF THE 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 
Robert J. Condlin 
I 
The 1970s was the decade of the clinic. In the early years clinical courses 
were few in number and marginal to the law school curriculum. Traditional 
faculty opinion was suspicious or negative, resources were patched together 
from "soft" sources, and people who directed these programs worked in 
obscurity and alone. Ten years later almost every law school has a clinical 
program, and many schools have several. Funding comes from general law 
school revenues, traditional faculty opinion is accepting, and sometimes 
enthusiastic, and clinical teachers are treated as full members of the faculty 
(i.e., they are eligible for tenure, are tenured in some instances, and are paid 
equivalently to traditional faculty). While all is far from rosy-there are 
exceptions to each of the above statements-at the organizational level the 
clinical education movement has been immensely successful. 
This success has not been without costs, however, and it is one of those 
costs I would like to discuss today. In our zeal to establish ourselves 
physically and financially we have neglected the intellectual dimension of 
our work. We have not developed a theory that allows us to criticize, in a 
fundamental way, the existing arrangements and procedures of law practice 
and legal instruction (including clinical legal instruction). We have allowed 
our potentially important contributions to these fields to become mechanical 
and technical, and to remain at the level of "methodology." Even at this 
level, our lack of a critical perspective has caused us to replicate many 
objectionable practices to which our movement was a reformative response. 
We have lost sight of our roots, our objectives, and our potential, and we do 
this at our peril. · 
I shall develop these themes by describing the thesis of my recent article 
"The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education,"1 and elaborating on my 
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proposals for reform. While I criticize particular characteristics of clinical 
teaching, I am not critical of clinical education itself, and I do not suggest 
that the idea has failed. Just the opposite: I consider clinical education to be 
an effective method of instruction, particularly for the teaching of ethics. But 
I also believe that many existing clinical programs are often ineffective and 
sometimes harmful. It is the present reality and not the potential of clinical 
instruction that I discuss. 
My thesis is this: Clinical teachers-in the way that we instruct-teach 
students to manipulate and dominate others as a matter of habit. We teach 
these processes not as part of a larger set of communicative practices that 
include ways to cooperate and share power with others or in the context of a 
moral or political theory, but as a complete repertoire of interactional skills. 
In addition, we teach these habits un-self-consciously, and thus have no 
methods for becoming aware of their presence or controlling their operation. 
Evidence for these conclusions comes from transcripts of supervisory 
meetings between clinical teachers and students; I discuss that evidence in an 
earlier· article. 2 
II 
The patterns that I have discovered in clinical instruction are these: We 
compete with students over the authorship of ideas and the solution to 
problems; we conceal our ends and strategies for achieving them; we 
attribute incorrect meanings to ambiguous statements by students, and 
evaluate those attributed meanings (and the students) negatively; we argue 
for preferences subliminally, indirectly, and sometimes hyperbolically; we 
suppress strong feeling, even when relevant to solving the problem at hand; 
and when necessary, we use our authority unilaterally to cut off discussion 
and suppress the investigation of differences of opinion. In effect, with the 
aid of subtle manipulative techniques, we take advantage of the power that 
the law school social structure places in our hands to 1mpose our views on 
students, or at least compel students to act as if our views had been imposed. 
Most important, we do these things pervasively, seemingly as a matter of 
habit, without regard to their necessity or appropriateness. 
These practices reflect a kind of instrumental world view that speaks more 
loudly about what we believe than our rhetorical protestations to the 
contrary. In this view, relationships are competitive, choices are strategic, 
questions are technical, and little room is provided for explicit consideration 
of politics or morality. Success in teaching seems to consist in having 
students follow our lead, in solving problems within our frames of reference 
(which may well differ from teacher to teacher). 
These practices would be of little consequence, and might even be helpful, 
if we did no more than teach about adversarial technique. But one of our 
important functions, one we can perform more effectively than traditional 
legal instructors, is teaching about ethics. We can help students analyze real 
ethical dilemmas and cultivate habits of behaving consistently with those 
analytical resolutions. Yet the instructionai practices I have just described 
2. Robert J. Condlin, Socrates's New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for Learning in 
Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 Md. L. Rev. 223 (1981). 
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are often destructive of ethical reasoning. The essential nature of reasoning 
about ethics is that it tries to universalize. It appeals to norms that apply to 
all people in all situations. An ethical actor looks at questions from the 
perspective of others' as well as his own. 
In this dialogue, actual or imaginary, participants make explicit their 
ends and the means for achieving them. They evaluate ambiguities, 
inconsistencies, contradictions, illogicalities, and the like in one another's 
statements, and pursue this process until an uncoerced and rational 
consensus is reached, a consensus that is not principally or unknowingly a 
product of ideology, rhetoric, status, power, or particular political arrange-
ments. Participants in ethical dialogue also are self-critical. They turn the 
standards they apply to the outside world-and for clinical teachers that 
would mean the standards we apply to traditional law teachers and 
lawyers-back on themselves, and with equal enthusiasm. In short, ethical 
dialogue tries to arrive at a critical, rational consensus about the legitimacy 
of ends and the relationship of means to ends. This kind of dialogue 
contrasts sharply with the dialogue that I have seen in clinical supervision} 
III 
The reasons for our instructional practices are difficult to specify. For the 
most part we are critical of manipulation and domination when they appear 
in traditional legal education and law practice. In fact, much clinical 
literature discusses, in different ways, the harmful effects of these very 
practices. It is paradoxical, therefore, that we would simultaneously use and 
criticize the same practices. 
This happens, I suggest, because of three characteristics we possess as a 
group. First, we do not have a sophisticated understanding of domination 
and manipulation. Thus, we do not recognize these processes in all of their 
manifestations, particularly their more subtle forms. We see them in certain 
standard places where they are generally reputed to exist (e.g., traditional 
law classrooms), or in their more graphic variations (e.g., the belligerent or 
overbearing lawyer), but because we understand the processess in rough 
ways, we are not good at identifying unfamiliar strains.4 
3. Our manipulative communication practices undermine our teaching in that our students 
may view these practices as models and attempt to emulate them in relationships with 
clients. The relationship between lawyer and client is similar in relevant respects to the 
relationship between teacher and student. The major difference, of course, is that in law 
practice the student (as lawyer) is the teacher. Thus, it is reasonable for students to behave 
toward clients as they perceive their teachers to have behaved toward them. Even if the 
transferrence of clinical communication practices is not so direct, if instead, students simply 
imitate our style to protect themselves in conversations with us, such imitation develops 
habits, and habits can easily develop into values. If this happens, clinical communication 
practices would be transferred into law practice by a more circuitous but just as certain a 
route. 
4. As evidence of this point compare the most popular clinical treatment of domination and 
manipulation, the book on interviewing and counseling by David A. Binder & Susan C. 
Price, Legal Interviewing and Counseling (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1977), 
with the treatment of the same topic by Robert Burt, Taking Care of Strangers: The Rule of 
Law in Doctor-Patient Relations (New York: Free Press, 1979). The differences in 
theoretical sophistication are monumental. I recognize that these books are different with 
different objectives. But for most clinical teachers Binder & Price represents the limit of their 
psychological understanding of domination and manipulation. 
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Second, for all of our advocacy about critical self-reflection, we are not 
critically self-reflective. Rarely do we write critically about ourselves and the 
patterns that appear in our teaching and practice. Moreover, if we tried, our 
theories of instruction and lawyering would be of little help, as they contain 
few conceptual categories that facilitate self-criticism. 
Third, we do not have research methodologies that produce data about our 
teaching in such detail and with such clarity that our manipulative patterns 
cannot be missed. The absence of this data cuts us off from one more source 
of self-knowledge, and we remain ignorant of our teaching practices and 
their effect on our students. 
IV 
How could these characteristics develop? Four explanations occur to me. 
First, clinical teaching is structured so as to prevent the development of 
critical theory, research methodologies, and self-knowledge. Most of our 
time is spent working on cases, and little is left for intellectual investigation. 
This is not so much an explanation, however, as a symptom. The design of a 
world in which there is little opportunity to develop critical insight is prima 
facie suspect, and must itself be justified. 
The second explanation is the widely held traditional law teacher belief 
that clinical teachers have nothing of interest to say about the operation of 
the legal system. This view is based on two facts: As a group, clinicians did 
not do as well in law school as traditional faculty, and clinicians do not 
write. This view is obviously not true about those clinical teachers who have 
something to say and have said it in articles that compare favorably with 
traditional scholarship. (The size of this group is debatable, but it is a real 
group nonetheless.) But more important, the "nothing to say" view is self-
serving and question begging. It assumes that the intellectual standards of 
traditional legal instruction are the proper standards for determining the 
worth of intellectual activity. The question that is begged-whether the 
intellectual activity in clinical teaching is less sophisticated-must be 
debated, and its answer cannot be assumed, either way. That debate has yet to 
occur. (To the extent that the "nothing to say" view is true in particular 
instances, it says nothing about clinical education in general. There are 
traditional law teachers who have nothing to say, yet no one would conclude 
from this that their fields are intellectually bankrupt. The argument makes a 
leap from particular cases in one class to a different general class, and the 
leap is unwarranted.) 
There is an important message, nonetheless, in the "nothing to say" view. 
By failing to write about our work, we reinforce the belief that we have 
nothing to say. Traditional law teachers logically assume that a person with 
insights into the legal system will share those views, and that a failure to do 
so is evidence of the lack of insight. The "nothing to say" view may be 
wrong, but it is not unreasonable. 
The third explanation for our instructional practices is that the teaching 
of adversarial skills gets carried away. Among other things, clinical work 
teaches students to compete against others on a client's behalf. Because real 
client interests are at stake, teaching about competition takes priority over 
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teaching about collaboration. In a semester, fewer interests are sacrificed if a 
student competes aggressively, even if against both an adversary and a client, 
than if he cooperates with both. 
Preferably, of course, students should learn to compete against adversaries 
and cooperate with clients. But that is often not an option. Learning to 
compete and to cooperate are each involved and difficult processes, which 
consist in the development of habit as much as the understanding of ideas. 
Habits take time to develop and a semester is rarely long enough. When we 
begin the semester (understandably) teaching about adversarial skills, 
therefore, often an indirect effect is that we leave insufficient time to study 
cooperative skills. It is like having three points to make in an oral argument, 
and getting only to the first, because the court took longer to digest the 
argument than one had expected. 
The final reason to explain clinical instructional practices is a form of role 
confusion. Most of us conceive of our role as that of practicing law jointly 
with students. Together with students we try to achieve client ends. We 
describe and demonstrate appropriate ways of performing typical lawyer 
tasks, and criticize student attempts to implement our suggestions and 
emulate our behaviors. This is perfectly adequate as a conception of 
practicing law, and as a conception of training students in technical lawyer 
skills. But as a conception of teaching about law practice, it is missing a 
critical perspective. In teaching we have an obligation to do more than pass 
on received technical wisdom, even at levels of excellence. We must also 
criticize that wisdom for its ideological properties, and the ways in which it 
contributes to justice or the lack of justice in particular cases. 
This critique should be substantive as well as procedural. We should be 
concerned with the ways in which existing distributions of resources, race, 
class, and sex influence outcome in litigation as much as we are with the 
influence of lawyer skill. Teaching about technical excellence at manipu-
lating existing procedural schemes condemns our politics to a status quo 
conservatism. 
Our failure to have a critical perspective is a serious concern. Critique is a 
special obligation of a legal academic. We are given time and resources to 
step back from standard ways of doing things and conceive of alternative 
approaches that have some greater claim to justice. More than marginal 
technical alterations (devising a better list of questions for the litany at the 
beginning of a deposition, for example), we are encouraged to produce 
fundamental reconceptualizations of law practice.5 Instead, we have cata-
logued the characteristics of excellent law practice and made marginal and to 
a large extent ad hoc criticisms. But we have not looked at those practices in 
5. Such critique is perhaps illustrated by Roger Fisher and William Ury's new book on 
negotiation, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In (Boston: Houghton· 
Mifflin, 1981 ). In this book Fisher suggests that positional bargaining and zero-sum 
competition are outmoded concepts with with to explain or conduct legal negotiation. This 
may be a radical idea. If Fisher is right, he will change most of what is now taken for 
granted in bargaining analysis. It is too soon to say whether he will succeed but Fisher has 
identified a new and potentially illuminating conception of legal bargaining, and made 
important strides in giving substance to this conception. 
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fundamentally new ways, or from the perspective of critical political or 
philosophical theory. 
Our failure to take a critical view not only isolates us from our best 
traditional colleagues but also guarantees that clinical instruction will die 
out. One can teach about a subject for only so long without amending, 
rewriting, or repudiating one's initial ideas. At some point ideas become 
commonplace. When this happens to an individual that person no longer 
has anything of interest to say. When it happens to an entire field of study 
the field dies. 
Clinical teacher role confusion . has other consequences. One is that 
clinical education, as a curriculum reform movement, is seen as a political 
phenomenon. We approach the question of whether clinical courses should 
be added to the curriculum as lawyers, not academics. We talk in terms of 
battle plans, alliances, appointments, and tenure. Convincing our schools to 
offer clinical courses is seen as roughly akin to winning elections. We 
organize constituencies, lobby undecided voters, and seek out economic and 
political leverage. It is no wonder that we have sometimes been described as 
anti-intellectual. 
It is sad that we discuss our work this way, in terms of organizational 
politics rather than intellectual breakthroughs. Clinical education is impor-
tant for the new and interesting ideas about the legal system that its 
distinctive empirical vantage point, theory, and reformative perspective 
make possible. If all of these benefits were not present, clinical education 
should not become part of legal education, even if we could win the 
organizational battles over tenure. 
Another consequence of role confusion is that we misinterpret traditional 
teacher emphasis on the importance of scholarship. We view the questions of 
whether and what to write as strategic. We ask, is writing the best way to get 
tenure?, and if so, what topics will please traditional law faculty critics? 
Should we write about substantive doctrine?, or take the riskier course of 
trying to identify and flesh out a distinctively clinical agenda? 
Again, I suggest that this is the wrong way to put these questions. One 
does not write about what is likely to please others; one writes about what 
one has to say that is important and interesting. I do not minimize strategic 
concerns. I believe, with Woody Allen, that "when the lion and lamb lie 
down together, the lamb doesn't get much sleep." But we have gone beyond 
ordinary strategic concern. We have a fixation with the strategy of 
scholarship which dulls our critical faculties and, in an ironic way, increases 
the likelihood that we will lose the strategic battles that seem to mean so 
much. 
Finally, perhaps the most important consequence of our role confusion is 
thq.t it prevents us from being intellectual. Rarely do we seem to understand 
simply to understand, or have the "rush" that comes from crafting 
"something true and truly put ... doing something very well that is very 
hard to do at. all. " 6 One effect, albeit instrumental, is that we may not 
entertain the far-out ideas that tomorrow become paradigms. But more 
6. Arthur A. Leff, Aftenvord, 90 Yale L.J. 1296 (1981). 
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important, we may signal to our traditional colleagues that we do not share 
with them the genuine pleasure of thinking, a pleasure that as much as any 
other factor is the payoff in law teaching. 
v 
My suggestions for reform for the most part are corollaries of what I have 
already said. First, as William Simon suggests, we need a phenomenology of 
law practice.7 We must report in a more detailed way than we have thus far 
about the day-to-day practice of law. For example, we do not know how 
negotiation typically proceeds. We know personally what negotiation is like, 
but no literature describes for a person who has never been involved-or for a 
practicing attorney interested in a more general view-the look and the feel 
of the process, in its multiple variations, from moment to moment, 
statement to statement, and sensation to sensation. As a result, we have 
produced no material for the analysis of legal negotiation which could be 
used by thinkers in related disciplines.8 Engulfed in day-to-day legal 
practice, we are in a special position to produce this phenomenology. The 
early Meltsner and Schrag articles9 present a good beginning phenomenol-
ogy of clinical law learning, but law practice, not law learning, is ultimately 
our subject. 
My second "suggestion is that we need to improve our empirical methods. 
Principally, we need to find ways to collect data with substantial claims to 
objectivity. The limited literature providing accounts of clinical practice has 
little if any discussion of the methods used to produce these accounts. The 
problems of how context, social structure and observer intention, memory, 
assumption, and expectation influence observation are rarely considered. A 
reader continually asks, why should I believe that this is how events 
occurred? Until we use better methods, there is little reason for other 
academics to take our "empirical" research seriously. 
My third suggestion is that we need to develop a critical tradition. We 
should turn the standards we have used to evaluate traditional legal 
education and law practice back on ourselves, and with even more energy. In 
the development of clinical education, this is the next logical step. We have 
fought for and won teaching facilities, course credit, manageable teacher-
student ratios. Our foot is well inside the door. Now what do we have to say? 
More self-criticism would give us better answers to that question. 
7. William Simon, Home Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 
487 (1980). 
8. A recent example in which such data would have been helpful in Melvin Eisenberg's article 
in the Harvard Law Review on rule invocation and reasoned elaboration in negotiation, 
Private Ordering through Negotiation: Dispute Settling and Rulemaking, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
637 (1976). Eisenberg's analysis is superb, but for his data he had to draw on anthropological 
studies of primitive and Asian cultures. How much more useful the article could have been 
had it been grounded in data about our own legal system. 
9. Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Report from a CLEPR Colony, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 
581 (1976); Scenes from a Clinic, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. I (1978). 
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In addition, our common view about effective educational reform requires 
self-criticism. If we ar_e not to become new educational oppressors, not 
simply to wear Socrates' new clothes, we must show that we can slip past the 
shoals on which traditional education has foundered. Describing those 
shoals is one step, and we have done this in our critique of traditional legal 
education, but demonstrating that we are free of the characteristics which 
cause foundering is another. That remains to be done. 
Moreover, our reputation with traditional colleagues requires that we be 
more self-critical. We are looked upon with suspicion in major part because 
we are intellectually monolithic. We do not criticize one another, we assert 
that everything we have tried has worked, and we believe that clinical 
instruction is the best format for all legal learning. Such positions are prima 
facie suspect. Traditional teachers react to us the way we react to law-and-
economics enthusiasts when they claim that all common law can be 
explained by the concept of efficiency. They know our views are overdrawn, 
but also that we have potentially important things to say. They hope that we 
will mature, and are willing to wait to find out. 
There are obstacles, however, to the establishment of a critical clinical 
tradition. Many of us have no interest in self-criticism. For example, Simon's 
exceptional piece about the inadequacies of clinical theory10 has produced 
only private sniping, and no public response from clinical teachers. My own 
efforts have caused some to accuse me, angrily, of "aiding and abetting the 
enemies of clinical legal education," and others to call for a moratorium on 
criticism of clinical instruction. These critics acknowledge that clinical 
instruction has deficiencies, but insist that the phenomenon is a weak sister 
within law schools and needs to be free of criticism if it is to have room to 
grow. My own view is that nothing ever grows by being reinforced 
constantly in its weaknesses.n 
My final suggestion is that we need to become more self-aware. Rather 
than espouse self-awareness, we must identify and drive out the rationaliza-
tions we use to hide from our weaknesses. These rationalizations take many 
forms (e.g., seeing our relationship with traditional colleagues as a "be-
leaguered us" versus a "menacing them," viewing the issue of clinical 
instruction as technical and our obligation as that of passing on a repertoire 
of instrumental techniques, and the like) but as much as any systemic feature 
of law school, they block our future development. We must ferret out each 
one and put them all to rest. 
10. Simon, supra note 7. 
I I. Much critical work needs to be done. Examination of three recent legal symposia (the 
Symposium of Legal Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J. 5 [1981]; the Symposium on Dispute 
Processing and Civil Litigation, 15 Law & Soc'y Rev. nos. 3 & 4 [1981]; and the Symposium 
on Clinical Education and Legal Profession, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. nos. 3 & 4 [1980]) shows 
how un-self-critical, untheoretical, and unempirical our writing is in comparison with that 
of our traditional colleagues, though I do not necessarily hold up their work as a model. We 
ought to be working on a more sophisticated critical literature, not resting content on the 
insights we have identified so far. 
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VI 
Having been unrelentingly unpleasant for long enough, I shall conclude 
on an opposite note. For all of its difficulties, clinical education still lives 
(this was not inevitable), and there is considerable reason to be hopeful about 
its future. Each year brings an increasing amount of interesting clinical 
work and more is possible. There are exceptions to each criticism that I have 
made, and in some areas, clinical thinking is among the most interesting of 
the profession. If the insights and energies of more of the seven hundred plus 
clinical teachers could be enlisted in this effort, the future of clinical 
instruction would be bright indeed. 
